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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Doctor Under Review: A Hypothetical
Dr. Amelia Adams' graduated from the University of Chicago Med-
ical School. Following graduation she completed a one-year internship
1. Dr. Adams is a fictional plaintiff whose situation is a combination of incidents from
case law and stories relayed during congressional hearings in 1986. Health Care Quality Im-
provement Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter
HCQIA Hearings]. For example, see the testimony of Dr. W. Michael Byrd, which relayed the
story of a physician who copied medical records prior to a peer review investigation. The
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at Massachusetts General Hospital. At the end of that year, she entered
a three-year internal medicine residency program at the University of
California at Los Angeles. After successfully completing her residency,
she undertook a two-year fellowship in cardiology at the University of
Southern California. Dr. Adams qualified for and passed the internal
medicine boards and cardiology boards-national examinations recog-
nized as" 'excellent benchmark[s]' for privilege delineation."2 Following
her fellowship, she joined an established Los Angeles health maintenance
organization (HMO) as a cardiologist.
Dr. Adams worked as a member of a three-person team of cardiolo-
gists. The HMO setting allowed her to see a wide variety of cardiac
problems, and she was able to apply all aspects of her training. She no-
ticed, however, that some of the skills and practices of the other cardiolo-
gists on the HMO staff were outdated. Having just completed a
university training program,3 and realizing that these doctors, although
also from excellent schools, had been out of training from five to twenty
years, she decided to volunteer to speak to the medical staff at lunch-time
lectures about new trends in cardiology. She believed this forum would
disseminate information to the staff without specifically calling attention
to any one doctor's outmoded techniques.'
The senior cardiologist, Dr. James, rejected the techniques she dis-
cussed at the lectures; he felt they were too costly.' Dr. Adams was dis-
appointed by Dr. James's decision and thought that cost containment,
records were altered during the peer review process to create an impression of incompetence
on his part. His earlier copies, unaltered, prevented the hospital from succeeding in its action
against him. Id. at 145.
2. ROBERT D. MILLER, PROBLEMS IN HOSPITAL LAW 113 (1990) (citation omitted).
"Privileges" in the medical setting means "authorization by the governing body to provide
specific patient care and treatment services in the organization, within well-defined limits,
based on an individual's license, education, training, experience, competence, and judgement."
JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., ACCREDITATION MANUAL
FOR HOSPITALS 319 (1990) [hereinafter ACCREDITATION MANUAL] (defining clinical privi-
leges). Hospital privileges must be renewed through a reapplication process every two years.
Id. at 101.
3. Cf HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 108-09 (testimony of Dr. Richard Seymour
regarding physicians with outstanding credentials who faced racial discrimination).
4. See id. at 56 (testimony of Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe relaying that oftentimes competent
physician "shortly after complaining within the hospital about unnecessary surgery or other
evidence of incompetence by other doctors... [is] thrown out of the hospital him or herself in
obvious retaliation"); see also Bolt v. Halifax Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990) (involving revocation of surgeon's privileges after criticism of
senior surgeon's technique).
5. Cf Mark I. Pinsky, Doctor Awarded $Z 7 Million in Suit Over Firing by Cigna, L.A.
TIMES, May 20, 1993, at A3, A23 (discussing suit where doctor claimed Cigna had campaign
to "replace better-paid, older doctors with younger, lower-salaried hires").
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such as economic and budgetary restraints, guided care more than cur-
rent medical standards.6 Discouraged, she was occasionally blunt in ex-
pressing her frustration at the hospital administration's resistance to
innovation. Consequently, Dr. Adams's aggressive style was perceived
as threatening to the complacent senior staff, especially in light of the
increasing demand for her services by patients expecting sophisticated,
state-of-the-art diagnostic and therapeutic techniques.
The other cardiologists refused to do "rounds"7 on her patients and
refused to let her do rounds on their patients. They gossiped to their
colleagues that she was not competent. When one of her patients suf-
fered an isolated incident of nonfatal bleeding after a pericardiocentesis,
Dr. James ridiculed and maligned her. Dr. Adams was, thereafter, in-
structed not to perform the procedure on future patients, and to refer
those patients needing the procedure to other staff cardiologists.9 Aca-
demic and ego rivalries fueled tensions within the cardiology department.
Unbeknownst to Dr. Adams, Dr. James hired a fourth cardiologist, Dr.
Hammond, and told him that Dr. Adams intended to leave the cardiol-
ogy department. Dr. Adams was then asked to leave, and when she
failed to depart voluntarily, the senior staff threatened her with an ad hoc
peer review investigation."0 She was told that the administration would
have her "screw-tanized" if she continued to practice cardiology. She
was given the option, however, to transfer, at a substantially reduced sal-
6. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 74 (testimony of Marilyn C. Farray relating
that "I found in Mississippi particularly that physicians have found themselves under censure
by medical staff committees ... [for] the kinds of patients they admit to hospitals"). Particular
reference was made to poor patients without insurance. Id.
7. Doctors are obligated to conduct daily visits known as "rounds" to their hospital inpa-
tients. Doctors typically rotate rounding duties for weekend coverage. See Austin v. McNa-
mara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting dispute among doctors over rounds).
8. Pericardiocentesis is a procedure in which the physician draws fluid from the heart
sac. It is associated with complications, such as bleeding, which may occur infrequently even
with the highest quality of care. 2 THE HEART ARTERIES AND VEINS 1365, 2185 (J. Willis
Hurst et al. eds., 1990).
9. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 77. Marilyn C. Farray testified:
They don't say get rid of doctors who serve the poor or minorities. They say he is
not providing good patient care. And my goodness, he was a really good doctor until
about a year ago. We just don't know what happened. He went bad, and take a look
at these records which we've dug up.
Id.
10. See id. at 78-79 (testimony of Victor M. Glasberg telling of physician he represented
who was subjected to ad hoc peer review investigation of physician's complete performance at
hospital, without prior notice or input into process); see also Austin, 979 F.2d at 731-32 (dis-
cussing ad hoc peer review investigation).
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ary, to the internal medicine department, where the HMO was
overbooked with patient needs."
Dr. Adams attempted to relocate and seek other employment as a
cardiologist. She was advised, however, that until she dealt with the
cloud over her practice at the HMO, she would be unable to make a
move.
Dr. Adams reapplied for her cardiology privileges at the HMO. Dr.
James personally selected a group of patient charts, including the chart
with the bleeding incident, and presented the charts to two cardiologists
from another of the HMO's facilities. After meeting with Dr. James and
reviewing the charts, the doctors wrote a report to the HMO executive
committee describing Dr. Adams's cardiology care as below acceptable
standards.
If Dr. Adams had been working in private practice,' 2 she might
have been able to bring an antitrust action against the doctors who con-
spired to exclude her from a cardiology practice at the hospital.' 3 Be-
cause the setting is an HMO, and the traditional competitive cost
incentives essential for antitrust actions are not present, her only re-
course is through traditional tort theories, 14 which depend on her ability
to prove that the medical staff or hospital acted in bad faith.' 5
Dr. Adams has an uphill battle before her: Because hospitals rarely
discipline doctors, the courts are inclined-as are her future employers
and patients-to think that the sanctions she received were justified.
11. Cf Marc L. Rivo, Internal Medicine and the Journey to Medical Generalism, 119 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 146, 146-47 (1993) (discussing recommendation that 50% of medical
school graduates become general internists; also discussing managed care organizational need
to "retrain subspecialists as generalists"); James Flanigan, Industrialization of Medicine Has
Already Started, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at Dl (discussing greater need for generalists than
for specialists); Dana Priest, What the Labels Mean, WASH. POST, July 13, 1993, at Z13
(describing primary care doctors as "gatekeepers").
12. For a discussion of health care delivery models, see infra part I.D.
13. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1117 (1986) (stating that collaboration involved in peer review may be
defensible under antitrust principles).
14. Dr. Adams could bring actions in libel, defamation, and tortious interference with
business relationships. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 111, at 773-78, § 112, at 787-88, § 129, at 984 (5th ed. 1984).
As the practice of medicine evolves from a predominantly private-practice-based profes-
sion to a network-based profession (for example health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
and preferred provider organizations (PPOs)), Dr. Adams's scenario will be repeated. See,
e.g., Mark A. Kadzielski et al., Peer Review Hearings: Nuts, Bolts and Flakes, 14 WHITTLER
L. REv. 147, 147-66 (1993) (discussing mechanics of dealing with physician peer review
disputes).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988).
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How, then, can she clear her reputation, return to her subspecialty prac-
tice and continue to practice state-of-the-art medicine?
B. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986
Prior to the implementation of the Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 16 Dr. Adams could have negotiated an ami-
cable departure from the HMO and perhaps joined another HMO or
private practice group.17 The HCQIA, however, was designed to elimi-
nate this alternative.18 Historically, doctors have been responsible for
self-policing the medical profession; thus, the profession has been open to
much criticism. 19 This previously unregulated disciplinary process al-
lowed a doctor who had been excluded from one medical community for
incompetence to relocate elsewhere and begin anew. 20 Concerned with
this situation, Congress enacted the HCQIA.21 The Act established stan-
dards for a self-policing process, in the form of peer review, and created
the National Data Bank reporting system for physicians whose compe-
tency had been questioned and whose care had been sanctioned.22 Hos-
pitals that fail to report physicians to the National Data Bank are
penalized,23 as are hospitals that fail to consult the National Data Bank
when they are granting privileges.24
The HCQIA creates a national net in which to catch incompetent
doctors.25 This net, however, will catch more than it is designed to
catch: Swept into the net and labeled as bad doctors will be those doc-
tors, like Dr. Adams, who have been excluded from hospitals or HMOs
for reasons unconnected to the quality of their patient care.26 This small
16. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 1784 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(1988)).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (1988); Susan L. Homer, The Health Care Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED.
455, 464 (1990).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(3) (1988); Homer, supra note 17, at 467.
19. Robert S. Adler, Stalking the Rogue Physician: An Analysis of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 683, 690-91 & n.26 (1991).
20. HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 32-45 (statement of Richard P. Russerow, Inspec-
tor General of Department of Health and Human Services, regarding medical incompetence
and discipline); Adler, supra note 19, at 691.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 1784 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(1988)); see 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2) (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 11137 (1988).
23. Id. (providing that immunity is forfeited).
24. Id. (providing that entity that fails to consult National Data Bank is presumed to have
knowledge of its contents).
25. Homer, supra note 17, at 454-56.
26. HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 74, 85, 87, 96, 145 (testimony of Marilyn C. Farray,
William A. Bogan, Victor M. Glasberg, David H. Weinstein, and Dr. W. Michael Byrd).
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group of doctors now must vigorously litigate their cases to protect their
reputations as well as their livelihoods.27 Aiding their cause, the HCQIA
recognizes the potential for peer review abuse and limits peer review par-
ticipant immunity to only those actions taken
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the further-
ance of quality health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded
to the physician involved or after such other procedures as are
fair to the physician under the circumstances, and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain the facts
and after meeting the requirement of paragraph (3).28
As codified, the HCQIA is entitled "Encouraging Good Faith Profes-
sional Review Activities.
29
C. California Peer Review Law
In 1989 the California Legislature enacted section 809 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code. These enactments codified and amplified the
peer review aspects of the HCQIA, creating in California a state-tailored
version of the federal statute.30 On September 9, 1989, the California
Legislature "opted out" of the federal system by enacting eleven addi-
tional sections to the California Business and Professions Code.3 The
legislature expressed concern over perceived "deficiencies in the federal
act and the possible adverse interpretations by [federal] courts of the fed-
27. Thaddeus J. Nodzenski, Where is the Quality in the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act of 1986?, 22 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 361, 371-72 (1991).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1988).
29. Id.
30. The HCQIA permits states to tailor the code. Id. § 11111.
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 809, 809.05, 809.1-.9 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993). These
provisions made California's due process requirements much more specific:
California still requires: 1) written notice of and reasons for the proposed ac-
tion; [and] 2) the right to request a hearing before a mutually-acceptable arbitra-
tor(s). The arbitrator should preferably be of the same specialty as the physician, but
with no direct financial benefit from the outcome of the proceedings. The arbitrator
should be someone who was not an accuser, investigator, factfinder or initial deci-
sionmaker.
Other rights include a physician's challenge to impartiality and the right to wit-
ness lists and to inspect documentary evidence. Some provisions are identical to
HCQIA, such as the imposition of the cost of the suit, including reasonable attorney
fees if a suit challenging the action taken was "frivolous, unreasonable, without foun-
dation, or in bad faith."
Homer, supra note 17, at 484 n.197 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 27:357
MEDICAL STAFF PEER REVIEW
eral act,"' 32 and stated that "the laws [of California] provide a more care-
ful articulation of the protections for both those undertaking peer review
activity and those subject to review."' 33 To encourage physicians to com-
ply with these statutorily imposed evaluations, the California Legislature
provided limited immunity to medical staff members participating in the
peer review process. A peer review committee is immune to liability for
its actions
if a member of the commission acts without malice, has made a
reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which he
or she acts, and acts in reasonable belief that the action taken
by him or her is warranted by the facts known to him or her
after the reasonable effort to obtain the facts.
34
California's grant of immunity is substantially similar to the immunity
provided by the HCQIA; a key difference, however, is California's "with-
out malice" provision.
Since 1990 California has required all medical staffs of twenty-five
or more members to create procedures guaranteeing due process in medi-
cal staff disciplinary actions.35 California statutes, therefore, now require
virtually all hospitals to adhere to established California case law regard-
ing fairness in the granting of medical staff privileges.
D. Health Care Delivery Models
Health care in the United States was traditionally delivered to pa-
tients through medical doctors working either in solo private practices or
in group or multigroup specialty practices.36 These private practice doc-
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(a)(2) (West 1990).
33. Id. § 809(a)(9) (West 1990).
34. CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.7(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). Under the federal version of the
Act, immunity is specifically not available for (1) civil rights actions, (2) failure to report the
incident to the National Data Bank, (3) due process violations, and (4) suits brought in state
court under the Federal Act, if the state (as California has) opted out of part A of the Act. 42
U.S.C. § 111 1(a)(l),(b),(c) (1988). Part of the reason California chose to opt out of the fed-
eral scheme is that California, a leader in health care law, already had peer review immunity.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). Additionally, California case law
established many of the procedural due process requirements that the HCQIA details. E.g.,
Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442
(1977); Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1991), review
denied, No. G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991); Tiholiz v. Northridge Hosp.
Found., 151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1984); Hailer v. Burbank Community
Hosp. Found., 149 Cal. App. 3d 650, 197 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1983); Hackenthal v. California Medi-
cal Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1982); Appelbaum v. Board of Directors,
104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 805, 809-809.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
36. See Melinda Beck et al., Doctors Under the Knife, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 29.
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tors relied on the hospitals of the community in which they practiced to
provide them with facilities for the hospitalized care of their patients.37
Hospitals contracted with doctors for the care of their patients through a
hospital-controlled process known as "privilege granting":3 8 A doctor
allowed to admit patients to a particular hospital is said to have privi-
leges at that hospital. a9 Privileges are renewed every two years." If a
hospital denies a doctor's privileges, he or she may not admit patients to
that hospital. 1
The first suits concerning the denial of a doctor's hospital privileges
were brought under antitrust theories.42 A doctor contended that he or
she has been excluded by his or her competition (other doctors who prac-
tice the specialty) for economic reasons and not for quality-of-care rea-
sons.43 These suits evolved into two areas of common law. One strand
dealt with privately owned hospitals and allowed those facilities greater
discretion in the selection of their physician rosters. 44 The other dealt
with public hospitals and focused more on a doctor's right to practice the
medical profession.4'
Private practice medicine is on the decline, and in its place various
programs of managed care are emerging.46 Most notable of these are the
HMOs.47 The HMOs have two primary models. The first is known as
the "staff" model. In this model the HMO employs its own medical
37. MILLER, supra note 2, at 104.
38. Ia
39. Id.
40. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 101.
41. Homer, supra note 17, at 460-61.
42. Havighurst, supra note 13, at 1137-38.
43. Id. at 1117-21.
44. See Daniel H. White, Annotation, Exclusion of or Discrimination Against Physician or
Surgeon by Hospital, 37 A.L.R. 3D 645, 659 (1992).
45. Id. at 666-69.
46. Because the Clinton administration has been promoting its health care reform, many
articles have become available on this topic. See, e.g., Joseph S. Coyle, Who Wins Under
Clinton's Health-Care Plan, MONEY, May 1993, at 98-105 (concluding that private practice
doctors in big cities will become "losers" while private practice doctors in rural areas will
become "winners"); Milt Freudenheim, The Xerox Health-Care Model, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1993, at DI (discussing Xerox's health care benefits as prototype for reforming ailing health
care system); Nancy J. Perry, A Report Card on HMOs, FORTUNE, June 28, 1993, at 110
(promoting quality of health care at HMOs); Dana Priest, Health Reform Fever? Pollsters
Take the Public's Temperature on Various Proposals as the Debate Progresses, WASH. POST,
July 13, 1993, at Z7 (indicating that Arizona citizens accept sacrifices to further goals of health
care reform); Rob Steitz, All About Managed Care; The Political Tealeaves Point to Medical
Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992, § 3 (Magazine), at 10 (discussing various health care
options).
47. Beck et al., supra note 36, at 29.
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doctors (MDs) and owns its own hospital facilities.48 The premier exam-
ple of this model is Kaiser Permanente (Kaiser). 9 Kaiser owns its own
hospital and clinic facilities, and its medical staff of physician-partners is
the Permanente Medical Group.50 The second model is called the In-
dependent Physician Association (IPA). 1 In this situation individual
MDs (who would be considered private practitioners) contract with a
professional corporation, the IPA, which exists only to contract with the
HMO. 52 Southern California's Family Health Plan, Inc. (FHP) is an il-
lustration of this model.5 3 FHP subscribers visit physicians in their pri-
vate medical suites and are admitted to independent hospitals. Through
financial arrangements with these physicians and hospitals, FHP controls
its costs.54
Other systems of managed care consist of insurance carriers provid-
ing a selection of Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), which are
doctors and hospitals that subscribers may use. 5 In some instances these
doctors are paid a fee per capita, 6 and in others it is a fee for service.57
The HCQIA did not anticipate the rapid evolution of medical care
from private-practice-based to managed-care-based. 8 The HCQIA was
developed, in part, as a result of the many suits by doctors against hospi-
tal-based peer review activities.59 This Comment explores how the
48. Id. at 33; see also Tom Morganthau & Andrew Murr, Inside the World of an HMO,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1993, at 39 (profiling Family Health Plan, Inc. (FHP)); Priest, supra note
11, at Z13 (defining health care terms).
49. See Lisa Belkin, Tradeoffs and Benefits of a California H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
1993, at B6 (characterizing Kaiser as nation's largest HMO); Kathleen Day, Kaiser
Permanente's Tax Break Challenged, Critics Say HMO, Usually Touted as Model, Doesn't Aid
Poor Enough, WASH. POST, May 27, 1993, at B13 (designating Kaiser as President Clinton's
program model).
50. See Patrick Ford, Medical Groups, Bus. J.-SACRAMENTO, Aug. 27, 1990, at S31 (list-
ing Permanente Medical Group of predominantly physician-partners as only practitioners for
Kaiser Foundation Hospital Plan).
51. Beck et al., supra note 36, at 33.
52. Id.
53. Morganthau & Murr, supra note 48, at 39. FHP also has a few facilities that operate
under the staff model. Id.
54. Id. passim.
55. Beck et al., supra note 36, at 33; see Coyle, supra note 46, at 98-105 (discussing HMOs,
PPOs, and other modes of health care delivery).
56. The doctor receives a fixed fee per month for the patients he or she is expected to care
for; in essence, the services have been retained by the insurer. Beck et al., supra note 36, at 33.
57. The doctors submit charges to the insurer at a reduced fee. Id.
58. Cf. Flanigan, supra note 11, at DI (noting rapid increase in managed care).
59. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, passim.
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HCQIA, designed for the private-practice model, can be applied to the
managed-care model of patient health care.'
E. Scope of Discussion
This Comment presents a framework for analyzing claims-like Dr.
Adams's-against the peer review committee members and the hospital,
HMO, or IPA (all hereinafter referred to as hospital). Next, this Com-
ment defines bad faith in the medical staff peer review setting by examin-
ing situations deemed indicative of malice.61 Finally, because most
physician claims against hospitals have traditionally been disposed of at
the summary judgment stage, this Comment proposes representative cir-
cumstances that establish a prima facie case of malice in the peer review
process.
This Comment does not address situations in which alcohol, sub-
stance abuse, age, mental health, or physical disability have impaired a
physician's ability to perform.62 This Comment's narrow focus is on the
60. Under California law, all HMOs, Idependent Physician Associations (IPAs), and pri-
vate practice groups that contract with or employ 25 or more physicians must provide peer
review procedures. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 805, 809-809.2 (,Vest 1990 & Supp. 1993);
CATHERINE 1. HANSON ET AL., CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASS'N, CALIFORNIA PHYSICIAN'S
LEGAL HANDBOOK 17:1 (1990). Methods to avoid this expense and aggravation have already
been devised; for example, contracts with physicians often have "termination without cause"
provisions. An IPA could then exercise this provision rather than conduct a hearing. Inter-
view with Lauren W. Wilson, Health Law Adjunct Assistant Professor, Southwestern Univer-
sity School of Law, in Beverly Hills, Cal. (July 6, 1993). Depending on the facts, this practice
could violate the California Business and Professions Code § 809. Id. Thus, part of a physi-
cian's ability to protect his or her position from improper peer review activity may evolve into
a dependency on whether he or she is in a structure that creates physician employees, in-
dependent contractors, or partners.
61. See infra part IV.A. The California statute requires that the actions be taken "without
malice," CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 809 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993), and the HCQIA requires
that the actions taken be "reasonable," 42 U.S.C. § 11112 (1988). For additional materials on
bad faith, see Homer, supra note 17, at 468; Charles D. Creech, Comment, The Medical Re-
view Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C. L. REV. 179, 196 n.126 (1988). In
the area of malicious prosecution-the area most analogous to improper peer review activities,
Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 483-84, 551 P.2d 410, 420-21,
131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100-01 (1976)--"malice" means "the prosecution was instituted primarily
because of a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 957 (6th ed. 1990). "Good faith" is the "state of mind denoting honesty of purpose,
freedom from intention to defraud .... being faithful to one's duty or obligation." Id. at 693.
Additionally, "good faith" is defined as an "absence of malice." Id.
62. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 820 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (providing sus-
pension or limitation of activities due to mental or physical illness); id. § 490 (allowing suspen-
sion for conviction of crime related to qualifications); id. § 2237 (detailing suspension for
narcotics, dangerous drugs, and controlled substances).
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physician, like the hypothetical Dr. Adams, whose competence has been
questioned for political, personal, or economic motivations.63
This Comment also addresses the impact of the qualified immunity
provisions of the peer review component of California's version of the
HCQIA on California health care law, focusing on the litigation spawned
by the qualified immunity provision.' These "Doctor v. Committee"
suits typically involve due process, contract, antitrust, defamation, and
tortious interference with business relationship claims.65 The antitrust
elements of the Doctor v. Committee suits are outside the scope of this
Comment.66
This Comment provides a legal model for determining which peer
review actions rise to the level of malice and, therefore, should not re-
ceive qualified privilege.67 This Comment concludes that the immunity
provided is qualified and not absolute because there are circumstances
when the participants, process, and documents of the peer review com-
mittee should not be shielded from the legal repercussions of the partici-
pants' actions.68
II. DEFINING QUALITY HEALTH CARE
What is quality medical care? No one appears to know the answer.
In April 1993 the American College of Physicians published the results
63. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 74, 134 (discussing "physicians who are im-
properly before peer review committees" and explaining that "[p]hysicians are maliciously
being deprived of their rights to practice medicine based on race, economics, social class,
ethnicity and even their political views"); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (profil-
ing instances where physicians are inappropriately challenged through peer review activity).
This Comment does not address hospital decisions to create "closed groups," which occur
when the hospital decides to contract, for instance, all X-ray work to one group of radiologists
at the exclusion of all others. These decisions have been upheld by various courts. See, e.g.,
Redding v. St. Francis Medical Ctr., 208 Cal. App. 3d 98, 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1989); Letsch v.
Northern S.D. County Hosp. Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1965); Anne
Arundel Gen. Hosp. v. O'Brien, 432 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
64. The peer review committee typically functions under the auspices of the hospital;
therefore, the committee members, as well as the hospital, are generally sued. Throughout this
Comment, the term "committee" will be used to refer to the hospital and committee member
defendants as a group.
65. Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 366.
66. For a discussion of antitrust law applied in the medical peer review context, see Havig-
hurst, supra note 13; William G. Kopit & Robert W. McCann, Old Wine in New Bottles: The
Increased Antitrust Risk of Hospital Diversification, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 601 (1991);
Charity Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L.
REv. 316 (1991); John E. Graf, Comment, Patrick v. Burge." Has the Death KnellSoundedfor
State Action Immunity in Peer Review Antitrust Suits?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 463 (1990).
67. See infra part IV.A.
68. See infra part V.
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of a study that "confirm[ed] that the way most physicians and review
organizations do peer review to assess quality of care is unreliable."69 A
1986 Rand Corporation attempt to develop protocols"° for six diagnostic
and surgical procedures revealed that "panels of experts could agree on
only 3 to 41 percent of the possible indications for the procedures.
7 1
Although significant research has been conducted in the last twenty-five
years in an attempt to define quality medical care, the only certain con-
clusion of that research is that physicians vary greatly in their opinions
as to proper patient care.72 Specifically, physicians have been found to
differ regarding the appropriateness of diagnostic tests, the choice and
need of treatment, the decision to admit a patient to the hospital, hospi-
tal-based therapies, and length of hospital stays. 3 As one commentator
wrote:
There is a lot we do not know, despite the spectacular advances
of medical science in the last half century, about how the body
works, about the causes and natural history of many diseases,
and even about the effectiveness of many medical treatment ap-
proaches .... In a recent Duke University study to develop a
model to estimate the effectiveness of various strategies to
screen high-risk individuals for colon cancer, the lack of re-
search data made it necessary to rely for many critical elements
of the model on the opinions of experts .... When asked to
estimate the percent of polyps that bleed before becoming can-
cerous-the critical factor in judging the effectiveness of the
most common screening technique for colon cancer which de-
tects blood in the stool-the estimates ranged from 2 to 100
percent. Similar wide differences were exhibited for estimates
of the percent of cancers that arise from polyps (10 to 90 per-
69. Peter E. Dans, Clinical Peer Review: Burnishing a Tarnished Icon, 118 ANNALS IN-
TERNAL MED. 566, 566 (1993); Rodney A. Hayward et al., Evaluating the Care of General
Medicine Inpatients: How Good Is Implicit Review?, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 550, 550
(1993).
70. "Protocols" are medical decision aids (for example, flow charts) for diagnosis and
treatment. John Billings, The Emergence of Quality as a Major Health Policy Issue, in MEDI-
CAL QUALITY AND THE LAW 21, 28 (John Billings et al. eds., 1990); e.g., id. at E-5.
71. Id. at 29 (citing R.E. PARK ET AL., Rand Corp. No. R-3280-CWF/HF/PMT/RVJ,
PHYSICIAN RATINGS OF APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS FOR SIX MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PRO-
CEDURES (1986)).
72. Id. at 31; see Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines As Legal Standards Governing
Physician Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 87, 97 (discussing shortcom-
ings of current legal methods to determine standard of care).
73. Billings, supra note 70, at 23.
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cent) and of the time between detectability of a polyp and de-
velopment of invasive cancer (6 months to 16 years). 74
Currently there are several competing methods to establish stan-
dards of medical quality.75 Some analysts advocate national guidelines
and protocols that would serve as reference points and, once complied
with, would be presumed to have met the standard of care.76 Others
advocate adopting the medical malpractice standard in the peer review
setting.77
Even if doctors could agree on a format for standards, the develop-
ment of a comprehensive set of such standards is still problematic.7"
Teaching hospitals, the American Medical Association, and professional
specialty groups, such as cardiologists and oncologists, are attempting to
resolve these issues and establish guidelines.7 9 Some hospitals already
monitor patient care-diagnostic tests indicated/used; predicted/actual
outcomes; projected/actual hospital stay-through statistical analysis
with the aid of computer proffles.80
The question then becomes, if poor patient care would support a
malpractice action, is it actionable under peer review? If not, is the doc-
tor's care considered quality? It has been suggested that hospitals, which
must compete for patients in an aggressive marketplace, have a right to
set their particular standards at a superior level of care."' May a doctor
be excluded from a hospital staff because his or her patient treatment was
not superior? These questions remain rhetorical because today there is
74. Id. at 23-24. The quoted paragraph is merely indicative of the author's analysis. Dr.
Billings describes a number of examples of expert physicians' failures to agree on diagnostic
tests, treatments, and predicted outcomes. Id.
75. For a general discussion of the various models, see Dans, supra note 69, at 566; Harry
P. Selker, Systems for Comparing Actual and Predicted Mortality Rates: Characteristics to Pro-
mote Cooperation in Improving Hospital Care, 118 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 820 (1993);
America's Best Hospitals, The 16 Specialties, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., July 12, 1993, at 78.
76. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Quality of Medical Care: Resolving Controversies over a
Sacred Cow, in MEDICAL QUALrrIY AND THE LAW, supra note 70, at 53, 63.
77. Id. at 61-65 (discussing various legal standards for determining quality of care).
78. Id. at 68.
79. Michael E. Carbine, Bringing New Accountability to Health Care, A Report of the Dis-
cussion at the Warren Conference, in MEDICAL QUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 70, at 73,
77; see also Havighurst, supra note 72 (advocating national guidelines to establish standard of
care for malpractice).
80. Billings, supra note 70, at 28-30.
81. Havighurst, supra note 76, at 5 8-60; see also Oliver v. Board of Trustees, 181 Cal. App.
3d 824, 830, 227 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1986) (discussing hospital criteria requiring members of its
consulting staff to be of "widely renowned professional ability and reputation in the area of
their specialty" and concluding doctor's lack of board certification and eligibility, his paucity
of publications, and overall lack of significant evidence to demonstrate superior qualifications
showed him to be ineligible).
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still as much art as science in the practice of medicine.82 Thus, any re-
view of medical competence must recognize that the doctor-patient rela-
tionship has components that are phenomenological13 rather than
biophysical. A review of each doctor's medical judgment probably
should compare it to what a reasonable doctor would consider the appro-
priate treatment for a particular patient.
III. IMMUNITY: DOCTOR V. COMMITTEE
A. Defining Malice in the Peer Review Setting
Although designed to thwart litigation, the "without malice" and
"reasonable" components of the California immunity provisions may ac-
tually create more litigation than they will resolve. 84 These provisions
"rais[e] false hopes of avoiding litigation" because, in reality, when a
sanctioned doctor alleges such improprieties, the parties must engage in
discovery-including document requests, interrogatories, and deposi-
tions of peer review committee members and hospital personnel-to have
even a likelihood of resolving the allegations.8 In the absence of estab-
lished criteria, the ambiguity of the phrases "without malice" and "rea-
sonable effort" in the peer review setting virtually precludes judges from
disposing of the cases at the demurrer and summary judgment stages.
8 6
There is no published California case that defines malice in the peer
review context. 87 Arizona and Delaware courts addressing the issue of
82. See generally Carbine, supra note 79, at 85 (discussing clinical judgment as "bedrock"
of medical decision making).
83. "Phenomenology" refers to the nonphysical aspects of the treatment of patients and is
receiving increasing attention in medical circles. See Dale A. Mathews et al., Making "Conne-
xions'" Enhancing the Therapeutic Potential of Patient-Clinician Relationships, 118 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 973 (1993).
84. See Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 373.
85. Id. at 373-75.
86. Sosi N. Biricki, Reconciling Section 1157, Elarn, and West Covina Hospital- Is the
Sanctity of the Hospital Peer Review Committee Salvageable?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 202-03
& n.101 (1987); see also Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 663,
114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 707-08 (1974) (stating that application of immunity privilege "depended on
resolution of factual issues and could not be determined as a matter of law").
87. Search of LEXIS, States library, California file (July 27, 1993); search of WESTLAW,
California Cases library (July 27, 1993). One depublished case, however, is on point. Gannon
v. Santa Ana-Tustin Community Hospital, 257 Cal. Rptr. 110, 120 (1989) (depublished May
18, 1989) used the principles derived in Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School District, 153
Cal. App. 3d 574, 200 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1984):
[T]he plaintiff had the burden to "show[ ] by a preponderance of the evidence [that
the administrator] acted with malice, that is, that he acted with hatred or ill will
toward [her], or he lacked reasonable grounds for believing the truth of the false
statements or he made the statement for a reason other than to protect the interest of
the one for whom the protection is given."
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peer review motivated by malice have determined that malice exists when
there is a "primary purpose [underlying the peer review committee ac-
tion] other than the safeguarding of patients.""8 One court observed that
although bad faith can be inferred from circumstances, "[p]rofessional
criticism or disapproval does not constitute malice."8 9 Similarly, a New
York court determined that overcoming the qualified privilege provision
requires malice that consists of "personal spite, ill will, or culpable reck-
lessness or negligence. Mere falsity is not enough, unless it is also shown
that the defendant knew, or at least was culpably reckless in not know-
ing, that the statement was false."9 0 Additionally, some courts have
looked to the failure to follow procedures and to provide a fair review
process as indicators of bad faith or malice.91
In a similar vein, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has held that
either actual malice-ill will-or implied malice-reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of the slanderous element of a statement-will suffice
to disregard the qualified privilege.92 The court said "[p]rofessional disa-
greement over the appropriate standard of care does not per se constitute
malice, either express or implied." 93 And in construing the HCQIA, one
commentator has concluded that "the test for good faith under the [Fed-
eral] Act... should be interpreted as 'reasonable belief,' a standard con-
sistent with the 'rule of reason' test typically used in health care antitrust
actions."94
Nor has California case law been clear about what constitutes a peer
review committee's lack of reasonable effort as a basis for denying immu-
nity. Just as the term malice must be defined, the requirement that the
committee act only after reasonable effort to obtain the facts and with a
Gannon, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (quoting Manguso, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 580-81, 200 Cal. Rptr at
538-39).
88. Scappatura v. Baptist Hosp., 584 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); see Dworkin
v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 517 A.2d 302, 304-05 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal refused, 521
A.2d 649 (Del. 1987).
89. Gilbert v. Board of Medical Examiners, 745 P.2d 617, 627 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
90. Greenfield v. Kanwit, 546 F. Supp. 220, 227 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 714 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1982).
91. Qasem v. Kozarek, 716 F.2d 1172, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1983); Ascherman v. San Fran-
cisco Medical Soe'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 651, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681, 699 (1974) (discussing
failure to provide hearing relevant to motive for exclusion).
92. Onat v. Penobscot Bay Medical Ctr., 574 A.2d 872, 874 (Me. 1990) (citing Tutle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985); Gautschi v. Maisel, 565 A.2d 1009, 1011 (Me.
1989)).
93. Id.
94. Homer, supra note 17, at 468; see F.M. Langley, Does Medical Peer Review Immunity
Exist After Patrick v. Burget? A Review of the Legal Fundamentals, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 137, 164-65 (1989).
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reasonable belief that their actions are justified requires clarification in
the peer review setting.9 5 Peer review committee members must comply
with these statutory hurdles to qualify for immunity.9 6
In December 1992 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the issue of a committee's reasonable efforts in Austin v. McNamara.97
Dr. Austin participated in both ad hoc and formal peer review meetings
regarding his performance at Cottage Hospital.98 The hospital initially
responded by monitoring his work; later, however, his privileges were
summarily suspended.99 The hospital's bylaws provided an appellate
mechanism, and Dr. Austin requested a Judicial Review Committee
(JRC) hearing." ° The JRC, comprised of impartial doctors and a former
appellate judge, found that the hospital's suspension of Dr. Austin's
privileges was unreasonable and reinstated him, subject to "procedural
consultations."101
Due to his exoneration at the JRC hearing, Dr. Austin brought an
antitrust claim in federal court. It was during the antitrust suit that the
Ninth Circuit ruled on HCQIA provisions. 102 Dr. Austin's privileges at
Cottage Hospital were no longer at issue. 103 In looking only to the anti-
trust provisions of the HCQIA, the court held the applicable standard to
be objective reasonableness: The "sufficiency for the basis of the defend-
ant's actions" is the only factor a court must consider, and the alleged
bad faith of participants is immaterial." ° In dicta, however, the court
commented on the reasonableness of the initial suspension of Dr. Aus-
tin's privileges by Cottage Hospital saying, "the refusals to 'cover' and,
possibly, the verbal attacks cannot be brought within HCQIA's immu-
nity." ' 5 This dictum indicates that the Ninth Circuit may find two
levels of analysis within the HCQIA: one level, with an objective reason-
ableness standard for antitrust actions; and another, with a subjective
reasonableness standard, for peer review actions.
10 6
95. See Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 374-75.
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
97. 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).




102. Id. at 732.
103. Id.
104. Id at 734.
105. Id. at 738.
106. Although the suspension was "unreasonable," the court found it to be a "different
question of 'reasonableness,' . . . than the issue of whether the defendants acted in the 'reason-
able belief that the [suspension] was warranted by the facts known after reasonable effort to
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B. California Case Law
Although no case law in California defines malice in the peer review
context, California law has long recognized the need to balance a doc-
tor's right to practice his or her profession against a hospital's obligation
to ensure quality patient care. For example, in Anton v. San Antonio
Community Hospital,"°7 the California Supreme Court declared that a
doctor's right to maintain hospital privileges at a hospital where he or
she had such privileges is a "fundamental right." 108
California common law after Anton recognized a substantive due
process right of a physician to practice his or her profession and devel-
oped criteria, tied to patient care, for exclusion. 9 Additionally, a proce-
dural due process component of California case law also developed,
establishing the process for excluding a doctor."' Finally, California
codified the substantive and procedural due process components of phy-
sician sanctions and, through section 809 of the California Business and
Professions Code, provided immunity as a benefit to those entities com-
plying with these provisions.
1. Duty to evaluate physician qualifications
In Elam v. College Park Hospital," I the Fourth District Court of
Appeal imposed a duty on hospitals to ensure reasonable procedures to
review and evaluate the qualifications of physicians. 1 2 The duty gives
rise to corporate liability if breached.' 13 Thus, the Elam court imposed
liability on a hospital if the hospital was negligent in "screening the com-
petency of its medical staff."11 4 Sophia Elam was a surgical patient of
obtain facts' as required by section 111 12(a)(4)." Id at 735 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(4)
(1988)).
107. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
108. Id. at 823-25, 567 P.2d at 1174-75, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 453-55.
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 826 (1980); Marmion v. Mercy Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 145 Cal. App. 3d 72, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1983); Miller v. National Medical Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 2d 81, 177 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1981).
110. Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1991), review
denied, No. G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991); Tiholiz v. Northridge Hosp.
Found., 151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1984); Miller, 124 Cal. App. 3d 81, 177
Cal. Rptr. 119.
111. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
112. Id. at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
113. Marcia A. Mobilia, Hospital Corporate Liability-Toward a Stricter Standard for Ad-
ministrative Services, in HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE 329, 337-39 (Mary M.
Bertolet & Lee S. Goldsmith eds., 1987).
114. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 165. For a more complete discussion of the
implications of Elam, see Biricki, supra note 86.
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Dr. Martin Schur, a podiatrist."1 College Park Hospital had granted
Dr. Schur staff privileges without inquiring into his malpractice his-
tory.1 6 Moreover, after discovering that Dr. Schur had been named in
at least one malpractice suit, the hospital failed to conduct a review to
ensure that his medical care was within the hospital's standards."1 ' The
Elam court held that the hospital's "failure to insure the competence of
its medical staff through careful selection and review creates an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to its patients."""
California courts, however, have been careful to protect physicians
from overzealous review committees. Though Elam requires hospitals to
be diligent in reviewing physician qualifications, safeguards exist to en-
sure that hospitals do not arbitrarily deny privileges to a qualified physi-
cian. The hospital's, HMO's, or IPA's decisions must be based on the
physician's professional competence-or lack thereof-and may not be
arbitrary or capricious. 2°
2. Duty to provide fair procedures
In Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Society, 12 1 the court deter-
mined that the defendant hospital improperly denied staff privileges to
Dr. Ascherman, a surgeon.' 22 Dr. Ascherman had been a member of the
hospital staff for approximately two years when his privileges were with-
drawn.23 During his tenure, he had admitted over 100 patients to the
hospital.124 Dr. Ascherman received no notice that the hospital was con-
sidering withdrawing his privileges, nor was he told that he had been
dismissed.' 21 In fact he learned of the hospital's action when a patient he
115. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 336, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 336-37, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
118. Id at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
119. See, e.g., Ezekial v. Winkely, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977)
(holding right to practice profession is protected from arbitrary interference); Rosner v. Eden
Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 592, 375 P.2d 431 (1962) (holding hospital privilege denial
must relate to quality of patient care); Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App.
3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975) (finding decisions must be rendered pursuant to minimal
requisites of fair procedures required by established common-law principles); Wyatt v. Tahoe
Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959) (requiring present cause to deny
applicant privileges).
120. Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826
(1980).
121. 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 655, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 656, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
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sent to the hospital was denied admission.1 26 The hospital subsequently
told Dr. Ascherman he had been eliminated because of overcrowding.
1 27
It then denied his request for a hearing on the basis that the hospital
bylaw requiring a hearing applied only in cases of dismissal or demotion
and did not apply to the hospital's decision not to renew a staff doctor's
privileges.
1 28
Generally, California courts will not second guess the actions of a
hospital in disciplining a physician;129 judicial review is limited to ensur-
ing that the doctor received a fair hearing. In reviewing the process, the
courts consider: (1) whether there was an impartial hearing panel; (2)
the adequacy of notice; (3) the doctor's opportunity to respond; (4) the
doctor's opportunity to present a defense; and (5) the doctor's opportu-
nity to confront and examine witnesses.130 Courts do not require that the
proceeding contain all the elements of a court trial or that it resemble a
formal hearing; instead the focus is on whether the doctor had a reason-
able opportunity to respond. 131 For instance, Tiholiz v. Northridge Hos-
pital Foundation 132 involved a hospital that suspended a doctor's
privileges for 120 days for violating hospital bylaws requiring him to per-
sonally examine and care for inpatients.133 The court held that the hos-
pital's suspension of the doctor satisfied the requirements of "fair
procedure"' 13 4 even though Dr. Tiholiz was given only an informal op-
portunity, which he declined, to explain his actions prior to the discipli-
nary action.
1 35
The court in Ascherman was unwilling to permit a hospital to act
entirely on hearsay information, without any further check of hospital
records or independent corroboration.1 36 The court determined that




129. See, e.g., Pick v. Santa Ana-Tustin Community Hosp., 130 Cal. App. 3d 970, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 85 (1982); Miller v. National Medical Hosp., Inc., 124 Cal. App. 3d 81, 177 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1981).
130. See Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824-27
(1991), review denied, No. G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991); Hackenthal v.
California Medical Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 442, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (1982).
131. Rhee v. El Camino Hosp. Dist., 201 Cal. App. 3d 477, 488, 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249
(1988) (quoting Pinkster v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 555, 526 P.2d
253, 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 255 (1974)).
132. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1984).
133. Id. at 1200-01, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
134. Id. at 1203, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
135. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 341-42.
136. 39 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
November 1993]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
stead, the hospital took the charges at face value and did not renew Dr.
Ascherman's privileges. 137 The court found that the hospital was obli-
gated to provide a proper hearing.
1 38
Additionally, California courts have long held that hospitals should
not use stale charges of misconduct as a basis for disciplinary proceed-
ings. For instance, in Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hospital District,"3 9 the
court ruled that a physician or surgeon who is currently licensed to prac-
tice and in good standing cannot be denied the right to practice merely
because of past conduct that subjected him or her to disciplinary ac-
tion.1" Dr. Wyatt's license had been revoked for performing abortions
but was reinstated in 1940.141 According to the court, the hospital
should consider "not [the] licensee's wrongful conduct in the past, but
whether or not at the time of his application for staff membership he is
competent in his field and worthy in character and professional eth-
ics."" Thus, if an applicant is to be excluded, it must be for recent
violations or currently existing cause. 
143
Finally, California courts have held that the record must demon-
strate that the hospital's investigation was "dispassionate and thor-
ough." 1" California Business and Professions Code section 809 provides
a series of procedures to ensure that the disciplinary process comports
with due process requirements.1 45 Recently, for example, the court ex-
plored current fair procedures status in Rosenblit v. Superior Court.
1 46
Dr. Rosenblit was an endocrinologist who was summarily suspended
from Fountain Valley Regional Hospital and Medical Center.147 First,
the hospital alleged that Dr. Rosenblit had left the hospital for seven
days-a four day vacation, plus a three day medical conference-without
arranging for another physician with privileges at the hospital to attend
to his hospitalized patients.1 48 This allegation was untrue.' 49 Second,
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959).
140. Id at 714, 345 P.2d at 96.
141. The abortions were performed during the 1930s and 1940s. Id. at 711, 345 P.2d at 95.
142. Id. at 714, 345 P.2d at 96.
143. Id.
144. Ascherman, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 656, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
145. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
146. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 1442-49, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819, 823-28 (1991), review denied, No.
G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991).
147. Id. at 1438, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
148. Amicus Brief of Calforina Medical Association in Support of Petitioner-Appellant at
1, Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1991) (No. 58-78-
77), review denied, No. G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991).
149. Id.
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the hospital stated that Dr. Rosenblit's care of thirty patients had been
substandard.150 Dr. Rosenblit, however, was suspended before any deci-
sion was made on the merits of his case.15 Indeed, the court of appeal
concluded that Dr. Rosenblit, although he had received a hospital hear-
ing and appellate review, did not have a proper, fair adjudication on the
merits.
152
The court endorsed the reasoning set forth in the amicus brief of the
California Medical Association, 15 3 which described Dr. Rosenblit's
plight:
Most troublesome is the fact that this physician was never of-
fered an opportunity to copy the medical records in the thirty
cases. This basic unfairness was compounded by numerous
other problems. First, Dr. Rosenblit never got a Notice of
Charges which set forth specifically what aspects of his care in
each of the thirty cases was alleged to be substandard. Second,
the hearing officer conducted voir dire of the hearing panel off
the record, in secret. Third, Dr. Rosenblit was required to bear
the burden of proving his "innocence," an unfair burden made
even more onerous not only by the lack of adequate notice of
the charges and access to the medical records, but also by the
actions of the hearing officer. For example, Dr. Kravitz, the
"prosecutor," repeatedly stated that there were numerous med-
ical journal articles that contradicted the articles which Dr.
Rosenblit presented to defend his care, yet the hearing officer
never required that even a single such journal article be intro-
duced or even named. . . .We file this brief to bring to the
Court's attention the profound importance of fair peer review
for the delivery of quality patient care in this State. 54
After reviewing the trial record, the court stated that "[t]he record dem-
onstrates [Fountain Valley] Hospital was dedicated to removing Rosen-
blit rather than providing a physician with a fair opportunity to defend
his treatment regimen. [The] [h]ospital resisted fair treatment at every
crucial step of the proceedings." '155 Emphasizing the importance of pro-
cedural fairness in peer review actions, the court of appeal chastised the
150. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1438, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1445-49, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825-28.
153. Id. at 1438, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 820 ("Having independently reviewed the fairness of the
administrative proceedings as a question of law, we agree with CMA and reverse.").
154. Amicus Brief of Calforina Medical Association in Support of Petitioner-Appellant at
1-2, Rosenblit (No. 58-78-77).
155. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1448, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
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hospital, pointing to the "notable stench of unfairness" which sur-
rounded the entire sequence of events in the hospital's handling of Dr.
Rosenblit.
156
3. Disciplinary actions must be related to medical care
In Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center,I"7 the California Supreme
Court determined that a hospital's rule permitting exclusion from staff
membership solely on the basis of a physician's inability "to work with
others"1" 8 required a showing that the doctor posed a "real and substan-
tial danger" to the quality of medical care. ' 9 The court held that exclu-
sion was improper because the hospital could not establish a direct link
between Dr. Miller's "controversial" and "flamboyant" personality,'
6 0
his alleged propensity for litigation, 61 and his readiness to express views
on treatment practices of other doctors and on hospital administrative
matters1 62 and their potential effect on patient care.1
63
Generally, "[c]ourts will examine the standards used as the basis for
corrective action to determine if they were irrational or susceptible to
arbitrary or discriminatory application."' 6' 4 Thus, a hospital must pres-
ent evidence that demonstrates a real and substantial threat to high qual-
ity medical care; otherwise, the courts are likely to overturn a hospital's
disciplinary action.'
65
However, when a hospital has compelling patient care reasons for
denying staff privileges to a physician, California courts have been very
willing to endorse the hospital's decision. Thus, in Cipriotti v. Board of
Directors of Northridge Hospital Foundation Medical Center, 66 the court
held that substantial evidence warranted the suspension of Dr. Cipriotti,
a psychiatrist, from the staff of a private hospital. 67 The hospital con-
cluded that Dr. Cipriotti's misconduct affected his and the hospital's
156. Id. at 1445, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825. The facts of this case are discussed at length in the
sections of this Comment that follow.
157. 27 Cal. 3d 614, 614 P.2d 258, 166 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1980).
158. Id. at 621, 614 P.2d at 261, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
159. Id. at 629, 614 P.2d at 267, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 835.




164. A. Robert Singer & Steven V. Schnier, Initiating the Peer Review Process, in ABA
FORUM COMMITTEE ON HEALTH LAW: PEER REVIEW AND THE LAW tab 2, at 12 (1986).
165. Miller, 27 Cal. 3d at 627, 614 P.2d at 276, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
166. 147 Cal. App. 3d 144, 196 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983).
167. Id. at 157, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
[Vol. 27:357
MEDICAL STAFF PEER REVIEW
ability to care for patients.168 Dr. Cipriotti regularly violated hospital
regulations requiring attendance at staff conferences,169 failed to keep
mandatory patient admitting histories and progress notes,17 0 improperly
supplied hospital employees with dangerous controlled substances,
171
condoned use of controlled drugs at parties at his residence, and engaged
in other inappropriate behavior.
172
Similarly, in Miller v. National Medical Hospital of Monterey Park,
Inc.,171 the hospital suspended Dr. Miller's staff membership pending the
outcome of an appeal of his conviction for conspiracy to murder his
wife.174 The hospital intended to review his suspension if his conviction
was "modified." 1 75 The court concluded that the hospital acted properly
by suspending Dr. Miller pursuant to its bylaws. The hospital correctly
established that he had violated the standards of the professional staff
and acted in a disruptive manner.176 The hospital reasoned that the
crime of murder was incompatible with the ethical and professional goals
of a physician and that, due to the widespread publicity Dr. Miller's con-
viction had received, his continued presence at the hospital could disrupt
the hospital's operation. 177 Although his competency in his treatment of
patients was not a factor in the hospital's decision to suspend, the court
rejected Dr. Miller's contentions that: (1) the suspension could not occur
until his appeals from conviction had been exhausted; 178 (2) the crime of
conspiracy to murder one's wife was not substantially related to the qual-
ifications, functions, and duties of a physician;179 (3) the bylaws were
unconstitutionally vague;180 and (4) the decision to suspend him was
biased. 181
Thus, once a doctor has privileges at a California medical facility, he
or she has a fundamental right to retain those privileges. 8 2 A medical
168. Id. at 151, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
169. Id. at 149, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
170. Id.
171. Id., 196 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
172. Id.
173. 124 Cal. App. 3d 81, 177 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1981).
174. Id. at 83, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 120-21.
175. Id. at 89, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
176. Id. at 92-93, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 89, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
179. Id. at 92-93, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
180. Id. at 93, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
181. Id. at 90-91, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
182. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 823, 567 P.2d 1162, 1174,
140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 454 (1977); see also Rhee v. El Camino Hosp., 201 Cal. App. 3d 477, 488,
247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (1988) (holding that hospital may not deprive physician of medical
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entity seeking to curtail or eliminate a doctor's established practice may




A. Factors Indicating Malice
How can administrators charged with the task of overseeing peer
review activities ensure that this process is conducted fairly? How is an
attorney faced with a potential peer review abuse claim to evaluate
whether or not the claim has merit? When should a judge rule that peer
review participants must defend an action arising from their peer review
activities? This section presents a series of factual situations that can be
viewed as indicating a lack of good faith or the failure to take reasonable
actions on the part of the entity conducting the peer review. 184 When
malice (California law) or unreasonableness (Federal HCQIA) is present,
the peer review members are not immune from liability and may be com-
pelled to defend lawsuits arising from their actions." 5
The following indicators should be useful for three potential parties:
(1) the hospital administrators, as a checklist to prevent possible abuse of
discretion and subsequent litigation; (2) an attorney who is counseling a
would-be doctor plaintiff to determine if his or her situation mirrors any
of the established fact patterns of abuse; and (3) a judge to distinguish
between pleadings that describe bona fide actions taken in the interest of
quality medical care and those that appear arbitrary, capricious or dis-
criminatory. "In this unsettled environment, peer review is a concept
under siege .... What should not be open for question is the need for
individuals involved in the process to approach peer review with caution,
care and concern."'
1 86
Peer review should be an ongoing activity of a properly functioning
hospital medical staff. The Joint Commission for the Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations requires quality assurance programs that
staff privileges without minimal due process protection); Marmion v. Mercy Hosp. and Medi-
cal Ctr., 145 Cal. App. 3d 72, 90, 193 Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1983) (holding that due process and
common-law right to fair procedure require that doctor be given notice when hospital is con-
templating terminating physician's residency).
183. Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Ctr., 27 Cal. 3d 614, 631-32, 614 P.2d 258, 269, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 826, 837 (1980).
184. Factual situations are taken from cases in which the courts reviewing the actions of the
peer review committee or hospital administration found improprieties.
185. See, eg., Langley, supra note 94, at 181; Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 373; Creech,
supra note 61, at 197.
186. Singer & Schnier, supra note 164, at 3.
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achieve high quality medical care through "monitoring and evaluation of
the quality and appropriateness of patient care." '187 Explicit peer review
of objective parameters to identify circumstances at variance with estab-
lished criteria may arise from: "the surgical review committee, which
reviews surgical procedures; the pharmacy and therapeutics committee,
which reviews drug use; the records committee, which reviews compli-
ance with requirements for timely, complete documentation; the blood
usage review committee; the antibiotic usage review committee; and simi-
lar committees [for] other functions." '188 Through this ongoing quality
assurance process the goal is "to identify trends or patterns of care that
may not be evident when only case-by-case review is performed."
189
In order to protect a doctor from unjust attacks on his or her profes-
sional reputation and livelihood while supporting legitimate peer review,
courts will be obligated to try Doctor v. Committee suits to sort out the
underlying facts. It is possible, however, that some of the litigation
might be resolved at an earlier stage if the parties know at the onset what
factors the court and jury might consider in determining whether abuse
has occurred.
1. Complaint is outside normal channels
One of the first indications that a peer review action has begun in
bad faith or with malice is that the complaint does not originate in the
normal course of medical staff peer review quality assurance functions. 190
If the quality assurance system is working properly, patterns of question-
able judgment or medical malpractice will emerge and be identified by
the quality assurance team.19' The complaint that originates and is pur-
sued from outside the normal quality assurance procedures is, therefore,
generally suspect.
An exception to this general rule occurs when a physician witnesses
questionable medical practice and brings it to the attention of the proper
187. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 115.
188. MILLER, supra note 2, at 114.
189. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 2, at 218.
190. Cf Bolt v. Halifax Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 821 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
924 (1990) (involving complaint not pursued through established peer review procedures);
Havighurst, supra note 13, at 1130 (discussing proper peer review as collecting and disseminat-
ing information to appropriate decision makers).
191. Cf Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 397-99 (presenting method to approach peer review
as scientific activity and not as political, economic, or social pressures response).
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authorities. 192 The case Rhee v. El Camino Hospital 193 provides an ex-
ample of how this element functions properly. Dr. Rhee was a new sur-
geon who applied for surgical privileges at El Camino Hospital.
1 94
Proctors were assigned to review his work and make recommendations
regarding whether to grant Dr. Rhee privileges. One of the assigned
proctors questioned Dr. Rhee's qualifications because of techniques he
observed Dr. Rhee using during surgery.' 95 The proctor notified the
quality assurance team, which then met, reviewed the information, and
took corrective action by counseling Dr. Rhee.196 New proctors then
monitored Dr. Rhee's surgeries and these proctors were asked to provide
the committee with feedback. 
97
This case exemplifies good faith peer review actions. The hospital's
internal review process eventually culminated in the curtailment of Dr.
Rhee's surgical privileges, 98 after considerable effort to help him meet
the hospital's quality of care standards had been made. 199 Demonstra-
tive also of the hospital's good faith is that Dr. Rhee's practice at El
Camino Hospital was restricted but not eliminated." °
In Bolt v. Halifax Hospital Medical Center,20' Dr. Bolt was also a
new surgeon. He received staff privileges and began a successful practice
at three Florida hospitals. Dr. Bolt questioned the care rendered by an
older surgeon, Dr. Smith.2 °2 Subsequently, he found his own surgical
practice under scrutiny,203 and this resulted in the revocation of his privi-
leges at all three hospitals.
Dr. Bolt's case underscores the fact that an abnormal origination of
a complaint may be motivated by a lack of good faith. Complaints that
192. This particular factor, the genesis of the complaint, should not be read to preclude the
hospital or medical staff from choosing to review charts when a doctor is charged with mal-
practice-no matter how that information reaches the hospital. In fact, the hospital is under a
duty to do so. See supra part III.B.1; see also People v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 234 Cal. App.
3d 363, 389, 286 Cal. Rptr. 478, 494 (1991) (holding that court could review in camera peer
review documents to evaluate charges of criminal negligence).
193. 201 Cal. App. 3d 477, 247 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1988).
194. Id. at 483, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
195. Id.
196. New proctors were assigned to eliminate the possibility of a biased proctor and to
allow Dr. Rhee a "fresh" chance. Id. at 485-86, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
197. Id.
198. Dr. Rhee's surgical privileges were limited to specific, approved operations. Id. at 486,
247 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990).
202. Id. at 821 n.16.
203. See id. at 817.
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originate outside the hospital's established quality assurance functions
are inherently suspect and should receive intensified review by the hospi-
tal and later by the courts. Although colleagues naturally have the best
opportunity to review a doctor's work, concerns must be pursued
through the established hospital procedures. 2 4 Any charges emanating
from a specific colleague should be reviewed for personal animus.
Charges that arise from one doctor's desire to do another doctor harm fit
squarely into the classic definition of malice.2" 5 Therefore, it is conceiva-
ble that even in cases where patient care has been compromised, the doc-
tor's motive for exposing it will defeat the peer review immunity
provision.
20 6
Additionally, this component of the analysis should also include the
recency of the alleged questionable care. Peer review that relies on cases
dredged up from years gone by must also be suspect.2 °7
In summary, the initial inquiry for evaluating lack of good faith
should consider the origin of the charges and the dates of the alleged
quality of care incidents. Accusations regarding long-past conduct or
originating outside established quality assurance functions are suspect
and should be subjected to heightened review.
204. See American College of Physicians, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual,
117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 947 (1992), which provides the following guidelines for peer
review:
It is unethical for a physician to disparage the professional competence, knowl-
edge, qualifications, or services of another physician.., without substantial evidence
Of equal importance, it is unethical for a physician not to report fraud, profes-
sional misconduct, incompetence, or abandonment of a patient by another physi-
cian ....
... [I]n the absence of substantial evidence of professional misconduct, negli-
gence, or incompetence, it is unethical to use the peer review process to exclude
another physician from practice, to restrict clinical privileges, or to otherwise harm
the physician's practice.
Id. at 956.
205. See supra note 61 for definitions of "malice" and "good faith."
206. Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 738 (9th Cir. 1992). The court commented that
some of the conduct of the other doctors on the medical staff was not "within the HCQIA's
immunity." Id. The doctors had refused to provide coverage of Dr. Austin's patients and had
made verbal attacks on his professional competence to nurses and patients. Id.
207. Cf Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 711, 345 P.2d 93, 95 (1959)
(hospital attempting to rely on past revocation of license for performing abortions to deny
privileges); supra notes 9, 26 and accompanying text (providing several accounts of physicians
challenged for reasons unrelated to patient care).
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2. Initial actions taken
The second factor indicative of good or bad faith in the peer review
process focuses on the hospital's reaction to the initial allegations. 208
How did the administration handle initial complaints and concerns?
Was the doctor considered competent until proven incompetent, or was
he or she considered incompetent-that is, summarily suspended or priv-
ileges revoked-until proven competent? Were the actions taken
designed to ensure patient care as well as to maintain the practice of the
doctor?
Situations in which the hospital or medical group's initial action is
absolute expulsion from the hospital or from a subspecialty practice must
be suspect. For instance, in Rosenblit v. Superior Court,20 9 the doctor
was summarily suspended without any review of the allegations. 210 The
appellate court later concluded that the hospital's actions were dedicated
to removing him.21
The initial reaction of the health care delivery system to complaints
about a doctor's care should be to investigate the matter.212 Whether
this investigation should be by a committee comprised of colleague physi-
cians or an independent physician review group is worthy of considera-
tion.213  Moreover, use of independent review committees assures all
concerned of the most objective evaluation of the doctor's care.214 Fol-
lowing the investigation, if concerns remain about the quality of the doc-
tor's care, the hospital should consider the following additional steps
before sanctioning a physician: education or training to correct the prob-
lem, mandatory consultations with other doctors, monitoring by quali-
fied specialist physicians of certain procedures, or limitations or
restrictions on the doctor's practice or procedures. Courts have gener-
208. See Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 442 (1977); Rosenblit v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1991), review denied, No. G008913, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991); Tiholiz v.
Northridge Hosp. Found., 151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1984); Hackenthal v.
California Medical Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1982); Appelbaum v.
Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
209. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819.
210. Id., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
211. Id. at 1448, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27.
212. When the initial investigation indicates "imminent danger to the health of any individ-
ual," the HCQIA and California law provide for an immediate suspension. 42 U.S.C.
§ 11112(c)(b)(2) (1988); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.5(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1993).
213. See William F. Minogue, Who Speaks for the Patient?, in MEDICAL QUALITY AND
THE LAW, supra note 70, at 9, 11 (recommending independent peer review because "[e]ven in
larger hospitals, internal peer review is full of legitimate impediments").
214. Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 401-05; see also SPENCER VIBBERT, THE DOCTOR
WATCHERS (1991) (describing Federal Medicare Peer Review Organization program).
[Vol. 27:357
MEDICAL STAFF PEER REVIEW
ally upheld hospital decisions to institute remedial actions.215 These in-
formal action plans may preclude the need to institute costly formal
hearing procedures that generally must follow any revocation or reduc-
tion of staff privileges.
The hospital must make reasonable efforts to ascertain the facts and
ensure that the allegations are rooted in patient care issues.216 Once this
has been determined, the hospital must provide the doctor with proce-
dural due process.217
3. Lack of due process
A third factor indicating bad faith is the denial of procedural protec-
tions to the accused physician.21 8 In the peer review setting, due process
requires both adequate notice of the accusations and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond to them.
a. notice
Rosenblit v. Superior Court219 firmly established the requirement
that the charges must detail the specific acts or omissions alleged to have
negatively impacted the patient's care.220 In Rosenblit, the hospital listed
thirty charts and gave a vague reference that fluid management, diabetic
management, or clinical judgment was questioned in each one.221 The
court found that the hospital had not provided adequate notice to Dr.
Rosenblit because the vagueness of the charges required him to painstak-
ingly "uncover the basis and scope of the allegations. 2 22 In order to give
the doctor an adequate opportunity to respond to the allegations, the
215. E.g., Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974) (requiring one year
in postgraduate neurosurgical training); Rhee v. El Camino Hosp., 247 Cal. App. 3d 477, 483-
86, 247 Cal. Rptr. 244, 246-48 (1988) (limiting practice to specific surgical procedures); see
also Hays v. Scripps Memorial Hosp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 753, 288 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1986) (requir-
ing obstetrics training program to perform dilation and curettage).
216. See supra part III.B.3.
217. See infra part IV.A.3.
218. See Qasem v. Kozarek, 716 F.2d 1172, 1177 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding reversible error
when trial court did not inform jury of procedural elements that should have been considered
in determining if peer review committee member acted in good faith).
219. 231 Cal. App. 3d 1434, 282 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1991), review denied, No. G008913, 1991
Cal. LEXIS 4251 (Sept. 19, 1991).
220. See id. at 1445-46, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1446, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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court proposed that the notice of charges2 23 include the "specific acts or
omissions which allegedly harmed his patients. '22
4
As the Rosenblit court suggested, hospitals must tell physicians not
only what aspect of their patient care is questioned, but also why it is
questioned. When a doctor is given a notice of charges, the following six
criteria should be provided for each instance of alleged improper care:225
(1) Each patient's name and hospital chart number.226 This infor-
mation allows the physician to locate the proper chart and his or her own
records.
(2) The date of the alleged act or omission.227 This detail assists the
physician in evaluating his or her own conduct and in making appropri-
ate information available to the experts to reevaluate the treatment event
in question.
(3) The specific act or omission of alleged substandard care.228 This
indication allows the physician to understand exactly what part of his or
her care is being questioned.
(4) The resulting negative impact on the patient's outcome.229 Spe-
cifically, the reviewing entity must provide its opinion of the patient's
223. The hospital must notify the doctor that it questions his or her care and is contemplat-
ing disciplinary action:
A physician who is the subject of peer review ... is entitled to written notice ....
The notice must state that an action against the physician has been proposed ....
The notice must also state the nature of the proposed action, that the physician has a
right to request a hearing... and the time within which to request such a hearing.
HANSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 17:3. "If a hearing is requested, the peer review body must
give the physician written notice stating the reasons for the proposed action, including the acts
or omissions with which the physician is charged." Id.
224. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1446, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825. It is also noteworthy that
the California Medical Association filed an amicus curiae brief in this suit on Dr. Rosenblit's
behalf. Amicus Brief of California Medical Association in Support of Petitioner-Appellant at
1, Rosenblit (No. 58-78-77).
225. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 80-81 (testimony of Victor M. Glasberg); Dans,
supra note 69, at 567 (discussing prescriptions for improving peer review); J. Robert Liset,
Conducting the Hearing: Legal Requirements and Practical Solutions, in ABA FORUM ON
HEALTH LAW, supra note 164, tab 3, at 11 (providing criteria for notice of charges).
226. See Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1444, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
227. Cf id. at 1445, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (describing Rosenblit's pleas that "guesswork" be
eliminated).
228. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 80-81 (testimony of Victor M. Glasberg relaying
charges: "Here are 30 charts, they demonstrate you used bad medical judgment.... It is like
telling a lawyer who has a trial record this thick, we reviewed your record, you exercised bad
legal judgment. In what regard? How? When? In what particular?"); Rosenblitt, 231 Cal.
App. 3d at 1444, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (remarking on "six letters pleading for a description of
the acts or omissions").
229. Cf. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1447, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (criticizing hospital's
failure to provide "description of how Rosenblit endangered the patients entrusted to his
care").
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expected outcome and how the actual outcome differed because of the
challenged doctor's act or omission.
This requirement allows the physician, expert witnesses, and physi-
cian's lawyer to know why the care is being questioned, and it also com-
ports with California's medical malpractice law.230 In order to sustain an
action for medical malpractice, the "evidence must be sufficient to infer
that in the absence of defendant's negligence, there was a reasonable
medical probability that plaintiff would have obtained a better result."
23
Additionally, California malpractice standards note that an "error in
medical judgment is not considered in a vacuum but must be weighed in
terms of the professional standard of care." '232
(5) The objective standard of preferred treatment to which the doc-
tor's care is being compared. Citations to relevant medical articles indi-
cating the origin or support for the preferred treatment should be
included.233 This information will enable the physician to identify and
collect support for other methods of treatment, including the physician's
own. Moreover, the hospital should be required to establish that the
physician deviated from normal treatment procedures:
[I]n order to judge a physician's performance in any particular
case, the norms of care for the condition in question must be
identified. For peer review to be effective, a group of practition-
ers must be able to "predict what the outcomes should be for
patients of a certain age and general health status with a partic-
ular diagnosis, if optimal achievable care is provided." '234
One of the flaws recognized in Rosenblit was the hospital's failure to sup-
port-for example, through medical articles-its position that Dr.
Rosenblit's treatment was erroneous;235 hospitals should be required to
support their positions at the earliest possible occasion.
(6) A proposed plan to correct such problems, including, for example,
education, consultation, monitoring, or restriction of privileges.236 Includ-
ing these details in the notice of charges would show not only the hospi-
230. Cf. Havighurst, supra note 76, passim (proposing use of national guidelines as mal-
practice standards and as guidelines for peer review oversight generally).,
231. Alef v. Alta Bates Hosp., 5 Cal. App. 4th 208, 216, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900, 905 (1992),
review denied, No. S026727, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 330 (June 25, 1992).
232. Fraijo v. Hartland Hosp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 331, 160 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1979).
233. Cf Amicus of Brief California Medical Association in Support of Petitioner-Appellant
at 1-2, Rosenblit (No. 58-78-77) (commenting on hospital's failure to support its position with
medical journal articles).
234. Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 396-97 (footnotes omitted).
235. See Amicus Brief at 1-2, Rosenblit (No. 58-78-77).
236. Cf Dans, supra note 69, at 567 (describing need for reeducation system and suggesting
refresher mini-residencies).
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tal's good faith intention to resolve patient care concerns in a mutually
agreeable manner, but would also provide the doctor with some indica-
tion of the hospital's view of the seriousness of the charges.
b. opportunity to be heard
The second element of due process that courts should consider is
whether the physician had an opportunity to respond to the allega-
tions.2 37 This consideration encompasses not only that the physician has
an opportunity, but that the opportunity is before fair adjudicators.238
For example, in Rosenblit, the court found that the selection of the hear-
ing officer, the "jury" panel, and reviewers was all tainted.23 9 In Apple-
baum v. Board of Directors,240 the court held that a physician subjected
to a professional disciplinary hearing must be granted the right to an
impartial tribunal.24' In Hackenthal v. California Medical Ass'n,242 the
court added that the physician must be given the ability to meaningfully
test the biases, if any, of the individuals who will hear and decide the
charges against him.243
Specifically, California Business and Professions Code section 809.2
details the elements of a fair peer review hearing.2 4 The provisions in-
clude the right to an unbiased trier of fact and hearing officer; access to
all the documentary evidence to be presented at the hearing; the right to
have a record of the hearing; and the right to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses. 45
-. 237. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 815, 567 P.2d 1162, 1168,
140 Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 (1977); Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1441, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 823;
Tiholiz v. Northridge Hosp. Found., 151 Cal. App. 3d 1197, 1202, 199 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341
(1984); Hackenthal v. California Medical Ass'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 442, 187 Cal. Rptr.
811, 815 (1982); Appelbaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658-59, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 837 (1980).
238. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1447, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826; Hackenthal, 138 Cal. App.
3d at 444, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 816; Appelbaum, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 657, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
239. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1448, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826-27. The hearing panel
conducted a private voir dire, and the committee chairman was a treating physician for one of
the cases under investigation. Id.
240. 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
241. Id. at 659, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
242. 138 Cal. App. 3d 435, 187 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1986).
243. Id. at 442, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
244. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.2 (West 1990).
245. HANSON EF- AL., supra note 60, at 17:3-:4.
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4. Unequal treatment
A fourth factor indicating bad faith is the disparate treatment of one
doctor as compared to the doctor's colleagues.246 In Bolt v. Halifax Hos-
pital Medical Center247 the court found reversible error when the trial
court failed to allow the testimony of Dr. Bolt's expert. 4 The expert,
who was chair of the University of Florida's surgery department, in-
tended to testify that "the conclusions [of the peer review committee]
were so baseless that no reasonable medical practitioner, considering the
same set of facts, could have reached those conclusions."249 From such
testimony the jury arguably could have inferred that the peer review
committee had an unreasonable and illegitimate intent. 50 The court
concluded that "the district court erred in prohibiting Dr. Bolt from in-
troducing evidence that the peer review proceedings were a sham and
that the ... defendants' reasons for revoking his staff privileges were
pretexts." 251
Taken from the defendant's point of view, the facts of the Bolt case
are essentially that a doctor who criticized the care of another doctor is
the one who is subjected to microscopic peer review and it is that doctor,
not the doctor whose competence he called into question, whose privi-
leges are revoked.25 2 In this instance the expert also intended to speak to
the competence, or in his opinion incompetence, of the care provided in
the case that Dr. Bolt called into question.25
Thus, courts should consider whether the evaluation of a physician's
competence should involve an examination of the care of other similarly
situated doctors. If a hospital singles out one physician for discipline and
ignores similar conduct by other physicians, it is likely that the hospital
is acting in bad faith.254 Thus, some sort of comparison may be in order.
246. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 486
U.S. 94, 98 (1988) (findings of bad faith and improper motive not considered; peer review
immunity due to state-action doctrine reversed); cf. HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 82
(testimony of Victor M. Glasberg regarding need to be able to call witness to testify "you
submitted charts too late, but so has three-quarters of the staff").
247. 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990). For a discussion of the
facts in this case, see supra part IV.A.1.
248. 891 F.2d at 821.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 822.
252. Id. at 815.
253. Id. at 821.
254. Cf Burget, 800 F.2d at 1503 (findings of bad faith and improper motive acknowledged
but not considered; Ninth Circuit's finding of peer review immunity due to state-action doc-
trine was reversed by U.S. Supreme Court); Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1447, 282 Cal.
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In Hayden v. Bracy,211 Dr. Hayden alleged that his care was as good or
better than other doctors in the hospital and that the records of his col-
leagues were relevant to his claim of malice.25 6 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals determined that although the other physicians' medical
records were relevant, the trial court had not abused its discretion in
denying discovery of such records. 257
Nonetheless, a physician who feels his or her competency is being
judged by arbitrary or capricious standards may have a means by which
to demand the review of similarly situated physicians' records. 258 In the
peer review setting, it is particularly appropriate to allow the questioned
doctor to demonstrate that he or she is being unfairly singled out.
25 9
Such comparisons allow the doctor to demonstrate that he or she has
used the same diagnostic criteria and treatment regimens as other doc-
tors whose care has not been questioned.2 6°
Disciplinary actions based on the failure to complete medical
records are also illustrative of the potential for abuse. Many hospitals
routinely suspend a doctor's privileges when he or she fails to accurately
complete patient medical records in a timely manner. 261  Conversely,
however, if a hospital chooses to focus on this common medical staff
problem in a particular physician's case or to impose greater sanctions on
one doctor, then that action, too, must be suspect.
Another area which lends itself to arbitrary or discriminatory peer
review action is the choice of particular medical treatment regimens. A
Rptr. at 826 (finding that failure to provide copies of charts in dispute violates fair hearing
rights).
255. 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984).
256. Id. at 1342.
257. Id.
258. Dr. Hayden was an obstetrician whose performance of cesarian sections (surgical in-
tervention to deliver a baby) was questioned. Id. at 1341. It would have been relatively easy to
review all cesarian section delivery records for a particular time frame to determine if Dr.
Hayden's decisions to use surgical intervention-based on progression of labor and fetal
health-were markedly different from his colleagues, who retained their privileges.
259. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
260. In the Dr. Adams hypothetical, for instance, she might request a review of all the
pericardiocenteses performed by other doctors at her facility. Theoretically, such a review
would reveal that the patients of the other cardiologists had similar complications, although
those doctors had not been sanctioned.
261. MILLER, supra note 2, at 116.
Clinical privileges are frequently temporarily suspended when physicians fail to com-
plete medical records within time limits established by hospital policy. Suspension of
admitting privileges usually continues until overdue records are completed. Physi-
cians who do not have time to complete records do not have time to accept responsi-
bility for additional patients. Courts have generally upheld disciplinary actions for
failure to complete records.
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doctor should not be subject to discipline for following a different medi-
cal school of thought than committee members. Doctors may follow al-
ternative schools of medicine. It is a well-established legal principle that
the standard of care spectrum must include all legitimate approaches to
patient care.262 Thus, it is important to assess whether the review com-
mittee's critique is levied at improper care as opposed to its view of pre-
ferred care.263 As the court noted in Rosenblit, "we are concerned with
fair play and fair treatment; with a physician's right to practice his pro-
fession; with the public's right to a diversity of opinion among competent
specialists and a variety of treatment options." 2 4
Consequently, any time a doctor is singled out for disciplinary ac-
tion based not on the quality of care he or she provides but rather on
what is, in effect, the discriminatory preferences of peer review partici-
pants, the actions should be suspect.
5. Disproportionate discipline
Malice may also be inferred from the severity of the hospital's disci-
plinary actions. The California Legislature had recognized reeducation
as a corrective device for a physician whose care is questioned.265 This
aspect is similar to the second factor, which focuses on the initial action
taken by the hospital.266 Instead of focusing on how the hospital re-
sponded to a complaint, however, this factor considers how the com-
plaint was resolved. Was the goal at this point education and restitution
in the interests of patient care and medical diversity or was the goal dedi-
cated to removing the doctor?
In deciding whether the hospital resolved the complaint appropri-
ately, the court must balance three competing interests: the public's, the
accused doctor's, and the hospital's. 267 The public has an interest in
quality medical care and in diverse medical care.26' The public also has
262. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 32, at 187.
263. Cf Havighurst, supra note 72, at 91 (discussing medical groups inclusion in practice
guidelines of treatments "supported by an appreciable number of its members"); id. at 101
(describing benefits of guidelines that provide "room for alternative" treatment).
264. Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1447, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
265. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(9) (West 1990); see also HCQIA Hearings, supra
note 1, at 62-63 (testimony of Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe discussing success of corrective educational
actions).
266. See supra part IV.A.2.
267. Paul L. Scibetta, Note, Restructuring Hospital Physician Relations: Patient Care Qual-
ity Depends on the Health of Hospital Peer Review, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1025, 1029-30 (1990).
268. Id.; see also Rosenblit, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 1447, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (noting public's
"right to diversity of opinion among competent specialists and variety of treatment options").
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an interest in keeping competent doctors in practice.269 The doctor obvi-
ously has an interest in protecting both his or her reputation and liveli-
hood. Even an unjustly accused doctor's career is stalled until the review
process is completed, and during that time he or she may be completely
unable to practice medicine and, therefore, unable to earn income.27" Fi-
nally, of course, the hospital has an interest in protecting its own reputa-
tion and ensuring quality patient care; indeed, it is legally obligated to
prevent incompetent doctors from practicing at its facilities. 271
The nexus of these three interests-patients, doctors, and hospi-
tals-provides the proper meeting ground for effective, fair peer review.
A peer review system that ensures competent physicians-who are not
only personally diverse but who also provide a variety of medically sound
treatment approaches-enriches the health care delivery system.
Although hospitals can and should avail themselves of insurance for
peer review liability,272 a prudent course of action is to develop guidelines
that ensure immunity by identifying and eliminating malicious use of this
disciplinary function. Furthermore, guidelines that provide a system for
conducting a reasonable effort and that provide the basis for a reasonable
belief will provide the safe harbor that hospitals require to examine legiti-
mate patient care concerns. Simultaneously, adhering to these guidelines
will provide safeguards to the doctors whose care is challenged.
B. Application: Hypothetical Resolved
Using these indicators of malice, a reviewing court would likely find
in favor of our hypothetical Dr. Adams. First, the origin of the com-
plaint against Dr. Adams was from outside the normal hospital medical
quality review channels. 273 Dr. James, not the hospital quality assurance
269. See, eg., Shawn Tully, America's Painful Doctor Shortage, FORTUNE, Nov. 16, 1992,
at 103.
270. For instance, Dr. Bolt scored a resounding victory in the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 924 (1990). Although the court criticized the hospital's procedures and remanded
the case for trial, the hospital has not settled with Dr. Bolt. Professor Clark Havighurst, one
of Dr. Bolt's attorneys, explained that this was a "vicious thing and very sad .... Dr. Bolt is
not practicing medicine still. His damages go on. There have been no offers to settle, the
hospital expects him [Dr. Bolt] to go broke and quit." Telephone interview with Professor
Clark C. Havighurst, Williams Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law (Nov. 5, 1992). For Dr. Bolt, Havighurst says, it has become a lesson in "how hard it is
to get justice" and that he has "gotten philosophical." Id. Professor Havighurst stated that he
has considered speaking with a reporter with the thought that some attention to this doctor's
plight might help to get the case properly resolved. Id.
271. See supra part III.B.1.
272. HANSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 17:7.
273. See supra part I.
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process, initiated the complaint. This genesis should shift the burden to
the review committee to prove that its actions were based on quality of
care issues and not on political issues.274 This would further the essential
goal of properly conducted peer review, which should be a "constructive
dialogue" to improve patient care.275
Second, the initial actions taken by the hypothetical medical staff
were to suspend Dr. Adams's right to practice certain procedures and
then to transfer her to another department. These actions were taken
prior to any investigation into the matter and without providing Dr. Ad-
ams with an opportunity to explain her patient care: She was presumed
incompetent. As a result, the second factor weighs in favor of a finding
of malice or unreasonableness.
276
The third indicator of malice, lack of due process, also is present in
Dr. Adams's case. She was not allowed an opportunity to defend her
medical care before disciplinary actions were instituted. Moreover, she
was not allowed to practice her subspecialty, cardiology, long before any
official peer review process commenced. Furthermore, she was not pro-
vided with any notice of the charges against her, nor was she given any
specific information regarding patients' names, charts, and alleged poor
patient care.
Because Dr. Adams's case was handled entirely without a formal
peer review process, the fourth and fifth factors-unequal treatment
2 77
and disproportionate discipline 27 8-are not applicable. These indicators
generally are useful only after a doctor has been accorded the peer review
process with an opportunity to respond to charges. These indicators,
therefore, relate to the administrative hearing itself.279 However, in this
case, Dr. Adams received unequal treatment. A review of all the peri-
cardiocenteses conducted in the HMO over the past year would likely
reveal other incidents of complications with no censure of the treating
physician.
274. See supra part IV.A.1.
275. HANSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 17:7; see also Dans, supra note 69, at 567 (discuss-
ing establishing better system for helping "marginal" doctors).
276. See supra part IV.A.2.
277. See supra part IV.A.4.
278. See supra part IV.A.5.
279. Generally, doctors are required to exhaust their administrative remedies. Westlake
Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465, 551 P.2d 410, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1976).
However, this requirement does not apply if the doctor is able to demonstrate that the adminis-
trative remedies would be inadequate. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d
802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
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Additionally, without any formal evaluation process-no attempt at
reasonable investigation to form reasonable beliefs-Dr. Adams's cardi-
ology practice was effectively extinguished. The failure to consider less
dramatic measures indicates that the only interest considered was the
hospital's desire to oust Dr. Adams. Dr. Adams's interests, as well as the
public's interests, were disregarded. Legitimate concerns about disap-
pointing care should be addressed through retraining, monitoring, or
proctoring. Revocation of privileges, and the relinquishment of a sub-
specialty practice, should be the final measure, after all corrective actions
have been exhausted.
Using the indicators of malice presented in this Comment, a judge
reviewing Dr. Adams's complaint, which likely would seek injunctive re-
lief-reinstatement to her position as a cardiologist on the medical staff,
pending the HMO's compliance with procedural due process-would be
able to rule in her favor with confidence. Dr. Adams's pleadings, consid-
ered in the light most favorable to her as plaintiff, would have presented
enough information to require not only the peer review committee to
defend its actions but to support the likelihood of her case succeeding on
the merits.
V. CONCLUSION
Doctors are dependent on medical staff membership and its attend-
ant privileges to function as healing arts practitioners. Unless a hospital
has granted a doctor privileges at its facility, the doctor is unable to ad-
mit patients to the hospital. Privileges entail not only the right to admit
patients to the facility, but specific rights to perform certain procedures,
diagnostic tests, and surgeries. The spectrum of privileges granted to a
doctor dictates the scope of his or her work at that hospital.
Historically, communities of doctors have used the granting of privi-
leges as a means to control the profession. Even as late as the 1960s, a
doctor's ability to practice medicine in a particular location depended on
his or her ability to conform with the existing medical hierarchy.28
280. See HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 70-73 (testimony of National Coalition of His-
panic Health and Human Services Organization discussing current discrimination practices).
In the 1950s and 1960s, local medical hierarchies of private practitioners ran the
American hospital system. As in earlier years, informal networks of physicians,
often using ethnic or religious grounds, effectively excluded outsiders, built up "dom-
inant positions for elite physicians," granted and maintained professional status,
controlled physician behavior, and minimized medical competition and conflict. Col-
lective physician professional standardsetting during this period was weak.
Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 391 (footnotes omitted) (quoting R. STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND
IN WEALTH 242 (1989)).
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The 1970s heralded antitrust litigation by doctors excluded from
practice in certain communities and hospitals281 as well as significant liti-
gation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.282 In the past five years,
two Doctor v. Committee cases made their way to the United States
Supreme Court.2" 3 In both instances the Court found that the peer re-
view process had been abused and ruled in favor of the privilege-denied
physicians.,284 As one commentator noted, it seems that the "Old Boys
Network" is still operating in the hospital medical staff environment of
the 1990s.2 85 In the most recent peer review case to reach the Supreme
Court, Justice Scalia commented that "[d]isputes over the denial of hos-
pital practice privileges are common., 286 Therefore, as the medical pro-
fession continues to evolve from being private-practice-based to HMO
and other network-based schemes that create closed situations, the peer
review process must be guarded to ensure that discriminatory, arbitrary,
and capricious practices are eliminated.
The immunity provided under the HCQIA and California statutes is
qualified because there are instances when the conduct of the hospitals
and committee members conducting peer review is and should be sus-
pect. Particular events and situations appearing and substantiated in the
pleadings of a Doctor v. Committee case should preclude summary judg-
ment in favor of the hospital and peer review committee members, per-
mitting the plaintiff doctor to proceed, at minimum, through discovery.
Moreover, discovery in these instances should include access to the hos-
pital's peer review records.
Heightened review is indicated by hospital decision makers, attor-
neys, and judges when the peer review process results in the denial of
privileges to an apparently competent physician287 where (1) complaints
are initiated outside of the normal hospital quality assurance channels;
(2) actions are taken without affording the doctor due process; (3) due
process-notice and opportunity to be heard-is a sham; (4) incompe-
281. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
282. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988); see Langley, supra note 94, at 165-71; Nodzen-
ski, supra note 27, at 393.
283. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94
(1988).
284. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1845, 1848; Patrick, 486 U.S. at 98.
285. Nodzenski, supra note 27, at 389, 390-92 (referring to "sponsorship" by established
physicians). See generally HCQIA Hearings, supra note 1, at 26 (presenting several accounts
of physicians whose privileges were challenged for reasons unrelated to patient care).
286. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. at 1854 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. That is, a physician who has enjoyed privileges at the hospital or other hospitals, who
has not been successfully sued for malpractice, who is board certified in a subspecialty, or who
has not been identified through in-place health care monitoring processes.
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tence is alleged notwithstanding the fact that the doctor's treatment rep-
resents an alternative, but recognized, medical school of thought; or (5)
the hospital did not consider reeducation, required consultations, moni-
toring, or privilege restrictions as alternatives to a total revocation of
privileges.
The California Legislature recognized the need to provide legal re-
course to maliciously sanctioned doctors.288 To make that recourse
meaningful, instances should be specified in which peer review committee
actions cannot qualify for immunity.
Pauline Martin Rosen*
288. For example, only a qualified immunity is available to peer review committee mem-
bers. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). Moreover, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 809(4) (West 1990) states that "Peer Review that is not conducted fairly results in
harm both to patients and healing arts practitioners by limiting access to care." Id.
* The author wishes to thank the Honorable Richard C. Hubbell, Professors Lauren W.
Wilson and Eleanor DeLashmitt, and Allen D. Rosen, M.D., for their thoughtful review of the
manuscript.
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